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A facilitated workshop was arranged to plan countermeasures that could
reduce the dose arising from the consumption of radionuclide-contaminated
milk products. It was assumed that a hypothetical accident in a nuclear facility
had led to the release of considerable amounts of radionuclides, which
subsequently spread across one of Finland’s most important agricultural
regions and contaminated the milk produced there. The participants in the
workshop, interest groups on food issues, considered all the factors influencing
the countermeasure decision, not only radiological or monetary ones but less
tangible psychosocial effects as well.
The participants preferred the countermeasures provision of uncontaminated
fodder and production control to banning and disposal. The analysis showed
that these countermeasures could be implemented even if the radionuclide
concentrations in foodstuffs were below internationally recommended
intervention levels. Banning and withdrawal of milk products from sale was
not a favourable option, because of the high costs and disadvantages to
producers and the industry, and because the disposal of enormous amounts of
milk causes a considerable environmental problem. The study revealed the
need to further develop methods to realistically assess the radiological and cost
implications of food countermeasures. The feasibility and constraints of actions
also need further investigation.
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The experience gained strongly supports the format of a facilitated workshop to
tackle a decision problem that concerns different stakeholders. The
participants considered the workshop and the decision analysis very useful in
exercises. They also expected a similar approach to be applicable in a real
situation, although the suitability was not rated as high as for exercises. It is
concluded that a facilitated workshop is a valuable instrument for emergency
management and in exercises, when revising emergency plans or in order to
identify issues that need to be resolved.
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Työssä selvitettiin hypoteettisen ydinonnettomuuden avulla millä
vastatoimenpiteillä voidaan vähentää maitotuotteiden kautta saatavaa
säteilyannosta. Onnettomuuden ajateltiin saastuttaneen keskikesällä laajan
alueen Pohjanmaata, joka on yksi Suomen tärkeimpiä maidontuotanto- ja
jalostusalueita. Tutkimuksessa arvioitiin toimenpiteillä saavutettua annoksen
todellista vähenemistä sekä toimenpiteiden aiheuttamia kustannuksia ja
toteuttamiskelpoisuutta. Lisäksi selvitettiin mitä tietoa eri tahot tarvitsevat
päätöksenteon tueksi. Työssä tutkittiin myös miten vastatoimenpiteiden
suunnittelua voidaan parantaa soveltamalla päätösanalyysin menetelmiä
toimenpidevaihtoehtojen luomisessa ja päätöksiin liittyvien tekijöiden
arvottamisessa. Päätösriihen ja sitä edeltävien valmistelevien kokouksien
osallistujat olivat toimenpiteiden suunnittelusta ja esittelystä vastaavia
viranomaisia.
Harjoituksen perusteella on arvioitavissa, että kotimaassa tapahtuvissa
ydinonnettomuustilanteissa on hyvin todennäköisesti mahdollista toteuttaa
kansainvälisten toimenpidetasojen alapuolella toimenpiteitä, jotka ovat
oikeutettuja ja optimoituja. Kansainvälisesti hyväksyttyjen toimenpidetasojen
ylittyminen merkitsisi kaupan olevien maitotuotteiden käytön kieltämistä.
Tehtyjen arvioiden perusteella käyttökielto aiheuttaa eniten haittaa.
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Tehdyn kyselyn mukaan suurin osa osallistujista piti päätösriihtä ja
päätösanalyysia käyttökelpoisena harjoitustilanteessa. Myös harjoituksen
hyödyllisyys kokonaisuutena arvioitiin suureksi tai erittäin suureksi.
Todellisessa tilanteessa sovellettuna menetelmää pidettiin käyttökelpoisena
vaikkakin hieman huonompana kuin harjoitustilanteessa. Päätösriihi
täydentää siten hyvin tavanomaisia valmiusharjoituksia.
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The real-time on-line decision support system RODOS (Ehrhardt and Weis,
2000) has been developed within the Framework Programmes of the European
Union with the aim of providing consistent and comprehensive support for off-
site nuclear emergency management. The Radiation and Nuclear Safety
Authority (STUK), on the other hand, has studied countermeasures that could
be implemented in the different phases of a nuclear accident. STUK organised,
as part of the RODOS project, a series of facilitated workshops, conventionally
called decision conferences, in 1997 (Hämäläinen et al., 1998). These
workshops dealt with countermeasure planning and decision-making in the
early phase of a nuclear accident and they were arranged in co-operation with
the System Analysis Laboratory (SAL), Helsinki University of Technology. The
following year the early phase protective actions were re-analysed by applying
an interview technique (Hämäläinen et al., 2000b) and a facilitated workshop
was planned to embrace the later phases of the accident. The present report
describes the facilitated workshop and its preparation with the RODOS
decision support system.1
The planning of feasible countermeasure strategies after accidental releases of
radioactive material can be very demanding. This is because there are, at least
in a large-scale accident, many different factors (radiological, economical,
social, political, etc.) that have to be taken into account, and interventions
affect so many different fields and strata of society (clean-up workers,
inhabitants, consumers, industry, tourism, etc.). Multi-attribute decision
analysis provides a suitable framework for dealing with the complexity of the
decision problem. It helps to clarify the objectives (‘avoid radiation induced
cancer cases’) and to identify the attributes that can be used to measure the
success of a strategy in achieving the objective (‘radiation dose’). It provides a
reasoning framework that intertwines the beliefs, preferences and value
judgements of the stakeholders and achieves a transparent ranking of the
different strategies available.
                                                     
1 The same case study is also documented, from a slightly different viewpoint and for a Finnish
audience, in Sinkko et al. (2001).
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The main findings from previous work in the RODOS project show that a
facilitated workshop is a useful way to analyse protective actions and to
support the decision-making process (Ahlbrecht et al., 1997; Bäverstam et al.,
1997; French, 1996; French et al., 1993 and 1996; Hämäläinen et al., 1998,
2000a and 2000b). It gathers together all interest groups in meetings at which
all relevant concerns can be discussed and possible decision strategies can be
constructed and evaluated. The process is best supported by interactive
decision support software, which allows building multi-attribute and other
decision models. The group is aided in their discussions by a facilitator and,
usually, analysts, who are familiar with decision aiding techniques. They assist
the workshop by keeping the discussion focused on the problem in hand, and
they ensure that all participants both contribute their views and fully
understand the points made by the other group members. In this way they
help create a shared understanding of the problem and the resolution.
A workshop was arranged a week after a hypothetical release and
representatives of different interest groups, i.e. the stakeholders, were invited.
The aim was to reassess the situation and to decide on a countermeasure
strategy that not only minimises the dose that the public receives from the
consumption of contaminated milk products, but that also takes wider
implications into consideration. This was important as countermeasures were
intended to be in place for a longer time span, i.e. during the coming weeks and
months. Also, the different interests of the stakeholders needed to be accounted
for. Phrased in the terminology of radiation protection, the intervention
strategy looked for should be justified (it should achieve more good than harm)
and optimised (the net benefit should be at its maximum when all attributes
are considered).
There are important differences in the characteristics of the early and later
phases of nuclear emergency management. In the early phase any decision has
to be taken under great stress and pressure of time and in a situation where
the total extent of the calamity is barely known. This is likely to improve
during the aftermath of an accident. Then time-pressures are mostly relaxed
and much more information is available. But the issues involved - health,
agriculture, trade, tourism, to name a few - are of growing complexity and call
for a thorough analysis. This is particularly essential since typical
countermeasures have long-lasting and far-reaching consequences. An
important objective of the present work was to shed light on later phase
countermeasures. For practical reasons, the analysis was restricted to the milk
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pathway. In many accident scenarios this is a major route of radionuclides to
humans.
National and international bodies have recommended action levels for
foodstuffs (Council Regulation No 3954/87, EU Radiation Protection 87, IAEA
Safety Series Nos. 109 and 115, FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission).
These are, however, generic in nature and rest on assumptions, like the one for
withdrawal and substitution of foodstuffs, that alternative food supplies are
readily available. The cost-benefit analysis used to derive these generic levels
merely struck a balance between monetary costs and the radiation dose. Other,
more intangible factors, such as political or psychosocial ones, were
deliberately excluded and accounted for only implicitly, for instance, when
rounding up the derived values. Another important aim of the present work
was thus to explicitly determine these ‘other’ factors and also to introduce the
values and beliefs held by the decision-makers into the decision-making
process. What are the other factors that need to be considered in the decision-
making process, what are the necessary value trade-offs, and how should
uncertainties be modelled and accounted for? Can countermeasures be justified
and optimised below recommended action levels?
Examining and defining the information needs in decision making and finding
successful formats for decision support system/decision-maker communication
were also topics of the present work. The participants of the workshop needed
to be acquainted with the accident scenario and the state of affairs. An
information package was intended to contain all information that is needed to
grasp the accident situation and to be able to make an informed decision on
countermeasures.
Conceptually, decision support in nuclear emergency management can be
broken down into different levels (Ahlbrecht et al., 1997): first comes an
assessment of the present and future radiological situation, at the second level
is the simulation of protective actions and the quantification of their benefits
and costs, and finally, different available strategies are evaluated and ranked.
This is roughly the concept that the research project RODOS has adopted with
the aim of addressing all aspects of nuclear emergency management. A major
achievement of this project was the RODOS decision support system for
nuclear emergency management. At its development stage available to us
(version 3.13) it contained, amongst other things, modules for atmospheric
dispersion and deposition, for tracing radionuclides in the food chain, for dose
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assessment, for simulating early and later phase countermeasures. The
methodology proposed for the RODOS system to evaluate and rank
countermeasures is described inter alia in Caminada et al. (2000), but modules
for this task were not integrated in version 3.13. The RODOS software was
used to evaluate the radiological situation.
Summing up, the present work had several goals: (1) to increase
understanding of the countermeasures that can be taken to mitigate the
detriment posed by radionuclides in the milk pathway; (2) to identify the
factors that influence and, more importantly, dominate the decision; (3) to
present, study and assist in developing decision support systems for nuclear
emergency management and the facilitated workshop approach.
The report is structured as follows. The events that occurred on the day of the
accident and the countermeasures that were recommended at that stage are
outlined in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 presents the countermeasure strategies that
were proposed for the later phase. The focus was on countermeasures that had
the potential to reduce the dose received from the consumption of
contaminated milk products. The workshop arrangements, the attribute tree,
preference weighting, sensitivity analysis and the results are described in
Chapter 4. The more general discussion is written in Chapter 5. The report
ends with Conclusions.
STUK-A186
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For the purpose of the study it was assumed that a core damaging and
containment leak accident2 had occurred in the nuclear power plant in
Olkiluoto on a working day in the middle of June. In order to increase realism
the scenario is based on PSA-analysis. The main events are given below:
A minor earthquake at 06:00 caused the loss of the external grid,
which initiated the accident sequence. It also broke the backup
battery cabinets. The automatic overpressure protection of the reactor
was successful and hydraulic SCRAM succeeded. The containment
was isolated. The overpressure protection valves closed. The auxiliary
feed-water could not be started during the next 45 minutes and the
manual pressure reduction of the reactor failed. Consequently, the
pressure could not be lowered to the operating range of the low-
pressure emergency cooling system. The core started to melt under
high pressure 50 minutes after the initiator. Within 90 minutes the
pressure reduction of the vessel could be recovered and the pressure
of the vessel was lowered. The core cooling systems could not be
recovered, however. The lower drywell (pedestal) was flooded. Two
hours after shutdown, the vessel breached into the water-filled
containment. The containment failed due to a corium spray hitting
penetrations above the water level. Thus, there was a direct path
from the containment atmosphere to the reactor building, bypassing
the filter and stack. The reactor building remained intact and, since it
is very large, some deposition occurred in the reactor building. The
corium remained under water. (Niemelä, 1997)
The release began two hours after shutdown, at 08:00, and lasted for 12 hours.
The release rate was not constant, and it was assumed that the initial intense
rate of release diminished roughly exponentially within 12 hours. The effective
                                                     
2 The occurrence frequency of such a containment failure accident leading to a significant release
is estimated to be less than one in 1,000,000 per reactor-year for this NPP.
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release height was 50 meters, which corresponded to an initial sensible-heat
release rate of a few megawatts (the actual release height was 10 m).
There were many uncertainties in the consequence assessment, but only
uncertainties about the release fractions were considered. A release was
assumed to happen definitely and it was assumed that the weather for the next
few hours could be predicted3. Furthermore, the branch of the containment
event tree could be identified and therefore the nuclear safety experts were
able to give probability distributions for the release. The 5th, 50th and 95th
percentiles of the cumulative distribution functions were used to encompass
the uncertain situation (Table I).
The accident day was a rainless day over southwestern Finland with weak
winds (4-9 m/s) from the south and southwest. The wind turned during the
night and started to blow to the southeast. There were sporadic rain showers
during the night and in the morning hours on the next day. Thereafter the
weather was dry again.
Table I. Release fractions for the 5%, 50% and 95% fractiles of the containment
failure groups’ cumulative distributions.
#$%!"#& $ '!"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Noble gases 4.7⋅10-1 4.9⋅10-1 5.1⋅10-1
Iodine total 2.1⋅10-4 1.2⋅10-2 1.3⋅10-1
Alkaline-group (Cs, Rb) 2.0⋅10-4 9.2⋅10-3 1.1⋅10-1
Tellurium-group (Te, Se, Sb) 2.0⋅10-5 6.1⋅10-3 9.2⋅10-2
Alkaline earth-group (Sr, Ba) 3.4⋅10-6 3.1⋅10-4 3.1⋅10-2
Ruthenium-group (Ru, Mo, Tc) 1.1⋅10-7 3.7⋅10-6 1.6⋅10-3
Lanthanide-group (Y, La, Ce, Pr, Nd, Eu,
Np, Pu, Am, Cm, refr. Ox. Zr, Nb)
4.6⋅10-8 1.2⋅10-5 3.1⋅10-3
 
                                                     
3 Weather data was based on past on-site measurements.
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First day decisions are based predominately on the plant-status.
Measurements and model predictions are used to build up a picture of the
radiological situation and of the factual and potential consequences. Initially
this picture is vague and subject to considerable uncertainties. Precautionary
actions on the first day are likely to be interim in nature and apply typically to
a few days. Within this time it is hoped to arrive at an improved and more
reliable picture of the situation: monitoring is drastically intensified; the fall-
out situation is analysed by a variety of means and organisations; samples are
measured and airborne spectrometry of the ground contamination contribute
important pieces of information. In essence, this results in sequential decision-
making. A few days after the release occurred, urgent decisions made on the
first day are re-evaluated, withdrawn or extended and altogether new aspects
and options are scrutinised. Decisions cannot be withdrawn or extended too
often, though, without risking loss of confidence and other adverse psychosocial
effects. Also, losses to industry, tourism, and the like are evident. This urges
the decision-makers to anticipate the future as far as possible.
For a successful implementation of protective actions, the intervention area
has to be well defined and easy to recognise by the public. It very likely
consists of a set of administrative units, which in Finland are municipalities
for many interventions. Hence, the benefits and harm introduced by protective
actions had to be aggregated within municipalities. The timing and duration of
the proposed protective actions were, in the early phase, related to the
presence of the radioactive plume and, later on, to the contamination level in
milk. A small set of intervention strategies, determining the bundle of
protective actions (sheltering, evacuation, etc.) that is applied in the affected
municipalities, was proposed and subject to a detailed decision analysis.
 "#!( #! !"(("%!$
&#)$
Early phase countermeasures to protect the population in this accident
scenario were analysed in Hämäläinen et al. (2000b). The findings were
discussed at a preparatory meeting, and it was concluded that the most
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favourable strategy was iodine prophylaxis4 in Eurajoki, Luvia, Pori,
Merikarvia and Siikainen and, additionally, sheltering throughout the passage
of the plume in Eurajoki and Luvia (Figure 1). Since core melt had occurred,
emergency plans also urged for an immediate evacuation of the plant vicinity
(5-km circle around the NPP). This information was available at the outset of
the workshop.
Figure 1. Urgent actions to protect the population.
                                                     
4 The timely distribution of stable iodine tablets relied on the (optimistic) assumption that tablets
are readily available. Finnish residential units are obliged to keep a stock of stable iodine tablets
and small households are encouraged to store iodine tablets.
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In a nuclear emergency situation, one of the first obligations is to protect the
endangered population. As some foodstuffs, e.g. leafy vegetables and milk, and
feedstuffs could be contaminated during the first days, precautionary
agricultural countermeasures also need to be considered before plume arrival.
The fictitious accident happened a couple of weeks before the first grass
harvest, which would have been due at the end of June. Most of the lactating
cows (85%) were on pasture at that time. Two proactive measures were
considered before the arrival of the plume: (1) Sheltering of cows and provision
of uncontaminated fodder and (2) harvesting of the grass before it becomes
contaminated.
$!%"'"- &!". ""'#"('"!
In the precautionary sheltering of livestock cows are moved into barns before
the radioactive cloud arrives. They are kept inside and fed on uncontaminated
fodder and water. Fodder and water supply are protected from contamination
as far as possible.
It was assumed that stored fodder was available in farms or that it could be
transported into the intervention area. Because air-exchange in barns could
not be blocked and a minimum of ventilation had to be maintained, a relatively
small amount of radionuclides was inhaled and transferred to the milk. As
there were other larger uncertainties, minor contamination due to inhalation
was not taken into account.
On the day of the accident the proactive sheltering of cows was planned for one
week. After that, in the light of a more accurate assessment of the fallout, it
was intended to be re-evaluated during the facilitated workshop and either
withdrawn or adjusted. The spatial extent, i.e. the municipalities within which
the measure was recommended, also had to be specified.
STUK-A186
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Figure 2. Time behaviour of the activity concentration in milk. 131I
concentration in milk reached its maximum on day 3.
Presumably based on plant status and measurements, necessary information
on the fallout composition was provided. As can be seen from Figure 2, 131I
contamination in milk was expected to be dominant during the first month. For
iodine isotopes in dairy products, the Council of the European Community has
adopted a maximum permitted level of 500 Bq/kg (Council Regulation No
3954/87). This level and a level a decade lower were used to define the
intervention areas. The consequences of two intervention strategies were thus
assessed, viz. provision of uncontaminated fodder in those municipalities
where the 131I concentration in raw milk on day 3 was expected to exceed 500
Bq/kg and 50 Bq/kg, respectively (Figure 3). The calculations were performed
with the 50% fractile scenario.
STUK-A186
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Figure 3. 131I activity concentration in milk on day 3. The average activity
concentration in municipalities is mapped5.
The RODOS system was used for the radiological consequence assessment. The
atmospheric dispersion and deposition module RODOS/ATSTEP (Päsler-Sauer,
2000) was used to assess the fallout. This information was the input
requirement for the food-chain and dose module RODOS/FDMT (Müller and
Pröhl, 1993; Müller et al., 1999). It modelled plant specific deposition of
radionuclides, contamination of feed- and foodstuffs and nuclide transfer
through the food chain to humans.
                                                     
5 In the information package distributed to the participants in the workshop ‘traffic light’ colours
were used to indicate the area where actions were advisable according to the EU's maximum
permitted levels.
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In a meeting held before the workshop the first day agricultural
countermeasures were ‘decided’. An assessment of the consequences of the two
strategies is given in Table II. All values were integrated over the first week.
More specifically, the collective dose encompassed the (50 years’) committed
dose to the consumers and was due to the milk production in the contaminated
area within the first week; it accounted for the local production rates and the
local activity concentration in milk. Within the action area milk was practically
uncontaminated during the time the countermeasure was in place. The
collective doses in Table II are due to the milk production outside the action
area.
The collective dose is the only relevant measure for the radiation risk because
milk is collected over wide areas and redistributed over the whole country so
that the eventual consumers cannot be identified.  The individual dose to the
milk producers in the affected area can be, if necessary, controlled by changing
the local milk delivery.
The collective dose was translated to the expected extent of additional cancer
incidence and to the additional number of fatal cancer cases. Children were
explicitly accounted for because they were particularly at risk of contracting
thyroid cancer.
Only direct monetary costs were assessed: costs proportional to the amount of
replacement fodder needed were attributed to the strategies. Feeding on
pasture was replaced with provision of uncontaminated grass silage, which
was assumed to be available from stock. A typical market price of 3 to 4 cent
per kilogram was assumed and allowance for transportation (2 cent per kg)
was made.
STUK-A186
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Table II. Consequence assessment when cows are fed on uncontaminated feed
for one week. Two intervention areas were investigated, viz. municipalities
where the 131I concentration in milk was expected to exceed 500 Bq/kg and 50
Bq/kg, respectively. No Action served as a reference. All values were integrated
over one week.
"" /00123% /0123%
Collective thyroid dose in children [manSv] 8710 56.6 0.7
Thyroid cancer incidence [No.] 69.7 0.5 0.0
Thyroid cancer fatality [No.] 7.0 0.0 0.0
Collective effective dose [manSv] 533 3.4 0.04
Other cancer incidence [No.] 39.4 0.2 0.0
Other cancer fatality [No.] 19.7 0.1 0.0
Costs [million euro] 0 1.1 1.3
Feasibility of countermeasures was a central issue in the problem. Table III
provided background data that helped to develop an understanding of the
extent of the problem and also helped to match the resources needed with the
ones available.
Table III. Production data in the first week. The computation area was about
100,000 km2. The intervention areas were based on the intervention criteria 500
Bq/kg and 50 Bq/kg, respectively.
4"$
"(&#"
!
!."
!
/00123%
!."
!
/0123%
Milk production [million kg] 22.37 13.18 15.84
Lactating cows [No.] 107,000 63,000 76,000
Replacement fodder needed
[million kg] 21.97 26.40
Replacement fodder needed
[No. of 500 kg bales] 43,940 52,800
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Harvesting of grass before it becomes contaminated was the other option
considered. Obviously, there were tight time constraints on this measure. For
example, within areas nearby the plant there was no time to even contemplate
such a measure. The warning time was after all only 2 hours. However, there
were large areas where the plume was not expected to arrive within, say, 16
hours (green area in Figure 4). Since it takes farms typically 2 days to get in
their harvest, experts judged that 16 hours allowed the farms in these areas to
harvest at least half of their fields.
Figure 4. Expected arrival time of the plume in hours relative to the start of the
release.
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Usually silage is used as fodder during the winter period. In an accident
situation, this fodder may well serve the implementation of the
countermeasure providing uncontaminated fodder, a follow-up measure
discussed in Section 3.2. It will be seen then that logistical problems in
supplying uncontaminated fodder and resource limitations cannot be
neglected.  To assess all the radiological implications of the measure the whole
winter period had to be considered.
The drawback of the measure was its cost penalty. The accident happened a
couple of weeks before the first grass harvest would have been due (end of
June). Consequently, the whole harvest was less than it would have been
normally - by an assumed 25%. Compared to harvesting as scheduled, a cost
penalty arose from this loss in the first harvest and was approximated by the
market price of grass silage. The consequences of harvesting in advance are
given in Table IV.
Decisions taken on the first day were not part of the workshop, which was
intended to deal entirely with the aftermath of the accident, i.e. from day 7
onwards up to the end of the harvesting season. However, information on
actions already taken had to be provided at the outset of the workshop in order
to familiarise the participants with the state of affairs. A preparatory meeting
was held to ‘decide’ on these actions. As a result it was advised to keep
lactating cows in barns in all municipalities where the 131I concentration in
milk was expected to exceed 50 Bq/kg. In addition, harvesting the grass before
contamination occurred was recommended in those municipalities where there
were more than 16 hours available before the plume was expected to arrive.
Table IV. Consequence assessment for harvesting as scheduled and harvesting
two weeks in advance.
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Collective thyroid dose in children [manSv] 207 198
Thyroid cancer incidence [No.] 1.7 1.6
Thyroid cancer fatality [No.] 0.2 0.2
Collective effective dose [manSv] 976 936
Other cancer incidence [No.] 97.3 93.3
Other cancer fatality [No.] 48.6 46.6
Costs [million euro] 0 1.7
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It was assumed that the fallout had been roughly mapped (presumably via
airborne gamma measurements) during the first week following the accidental
release and that numerous samples of milk and fodder had been analysed. It
was concluded that the fallout could be explained by the 50th percentile release.
Initially prevailing uncertainties were considerably downsized, but dose
assessments were still believed to be only accurate within a factor of 2 or 3.
Figure 2 shows that in the first weeks there was considerably more activity in
milk due to 131I than due to the caesium isotopes. 131I activity reached its peak
on the 3rd day and then declined rapidly, about two decades within the first
month. After this month the situation changed and the caesium isotopes
started to dominate. The pasture season ended in mid-September and the
feeding regime was switched to silage that, for the most part, had been
harvested throughout the summer. This is echoed in Figure 2 by an abrupt
increase in the activity concentration in milk around day 90. The figure
suggests a serious problem during the winter season too. In most parts the
situation was less dramatic, however, as the figure depicts the assessment for
the most severely affected municipality. The end of the pasture season marked
the end of the analysis period. The change of roles of iodine and caesium after
one month suggested a subdivision of this period: the first period spanned
weeks 2 to 5 after the accident and 131I concentration in milk provided the
reference for any intervention level; the second period comprised weeks 6 to 12
and the 137Cs concentration in milk at the beginning of this period provided the
reference.
Raw milk is processed in dairies into fresh milk, sour milk, milk powder,
butter, cream, cheese, etc. The last entry in Table V shows, for example, the
production routine at the dairy of Seinäjoki - the largest dairy in the region we
are looking at. It processes 30 to 40 percent of the incoming raw milk into fresh
and sour milk and the rest into butter and milk powder. The Seinäjoki dairy
does not produce cheese, which is done by smaller dairies specialising in cheese
production. The activity transfer from raw milk to the products is described by
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processing factors6 (Table V). These factors express the concentration ratio
between products and raw milk. The production processes enrich, dilute or
secrete radionuclides; for example when making butter the activity
concentration drops by 50% for iodine and 80% for caesium. The processing
efficiency corresponds to the mass ratio of product and raw milk and expresses
the yield of the final product per unit of raw milk. The eventual activity
concentration in products also depends, at least for short-lived nuclides, on the
processing and typical storage time. The longer shelf-lives of butter and milk
powder can be utilised to achieve reduced activity levels of short-lived nuclides
like 131I.
The countermeasure milk processing into butter, cream and cheese utilises the
lower processing factors of these products. Milk powder is special because the
water content that is evaporated during production is replaced before
consumption. This does not change the collective dose. But the increased
storability can be taken advantage of and this is considered in the
countermeasure storage of milk products. It acts on the storage time parameter
in Table V.
Eventually the products reach the shelves of retailers. In the aftermath of an
accident the production is routinely monitored. Products that exceed maximum
permitted levels have to be banned and withdrawn from the market. The
countermeasure banning takes the products off the shelves.
* "#!( #! '"!(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The situation and the measures taken a week earlier were reassessed at this
stage. Different courses of actions were available. The measure supply of
uncontaminated fodder could be lifted or it could be continued. Alternatively,
milk could be processed into butter and milk powder. Finally, milk could be
banned and disposed of. These were the most applicable countermeasures
analysed at this stage.
                                                     
6 A related quantity used elsewhere in the literature (for example, IAEA Technical Report Series
No. 363) is the food processing retention factor, which expresses the fraction of radionuclides
retained in the food after processing. Dividing the food processing retention factor by processing
efficiency yields the processing factors used here.
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Table V. Factors used to quantify milk processing. The ‘processing factors’
express the concentration ratio between products and raw milk. The ‘processing
efficiencies’ correspond to the mass ratio of product and raw milk. The last line
of the table shows the proportion of the raw milk going into each production
line. These are specific to a dairy and the values given here apply to the dairy of
Seinäjoki.
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Processing factor
for iodine 1.0 8.3 0.5 0.7 0.6 1.4
Processing factor
for caesium 1.0 8.3 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.6
Processing and
storage times
(days)
1 30 10 2 30 2
Processing
efficiency 1.0 0.12 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.1
Production 0.3-0.4 0.6-0.7 0.6-0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sorbents reduce the absorbed fraction and could be added to cows’ feedstuffs or
directly added to their gut in the form of boli. Their use in the form of boli is
not legal in Finland, however, and the option was not further analysed.
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""'#"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Provision of uncontaminated fodder was advised a week earlier in those
municipalities where the 131I concentration in milk exceeded 50 Bq/kg (Figure
3). The measure was reassessed for the coming month. The question was: is it
advisable to withdraw it or should it be continued, and how should its regional
extent be adjusted? To find an answer, the consequences were evaluated for
the options (1) withdrawal, (2) continuation of the measure and (3) reduction of
its intervention area to those municipalities where the activity in milk
exceeded 500 Bq/kg on day 3. Columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table VI show the
outcomes.
Costs proportional to the amount of replacement fodder needed were attributed
to this countermeasure. It was assumed that replacement fodder had to be
taken from elsewhere and a market price of 3 to 4 cent per kg was used in the
assessment. Transportation overheads were accounted for by 2 cent per kg.
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More aspects were taken into consideration during the facilitated workshop.
For example, the provision of replacement fodder for a month over such a large
area posed considerable logistical problems.
$3&!"  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Making changes to the production routine was a countermeasure that was
investigated as an alternative. As described in Section 3.1, the production
processes enrich, dilute or secrete radionuclides (see Table I). Also, the longer
shelf-lives of butter and milk powder can be utilised to achieve reduced activity
levels of short-lived nuclides such as 131I. As a countermeasure it was assumed
that all milk is processed into butter and milk powder during the coming
month. The measure was evaluated in two intervention areas: the larger one
was limited by an activity concentration of 131I on day 3 of 50 Bq/kg and the
other one by 500 Bq/kg (Figure 3). Columns 5 and 6 in Table VI show an
assessment of the attributes.
The process yields milk powder and butter in a ratio of 9 to 1. The costs of this
countermeasure were approximated by the production costs of milk powder; no
allowance was made for the costs associated with the change in the production
routine or the like. For example, the prospect of contaminating the production
facilities caused concern and certainly clean-up costs will be incurred. These
concerns were addressed during the workshop, however.
%
Banning was seen as a last-resort measure. This measure was also evaluated
for the two intervention areas mentioned above, viz. the one marked by 500
Bq/kg and the other by 50 Bq/kg. It was expected that banning causes a
considerable environmental problem since vast amounts of milk would need to
be disposed of. From a radiological standpoint, however, it was expected to be
fully effective since no products with contamination levels beyond intervention
levels reach consumers. Residual doses are due to the milk that comes from
outside the intervention area.
Disposal of milk incurs expense. But loss of income, too, can be attributed to
this measure. The producer’s price for milk is, on average, 35 cent per kg and,
with subsidies and quality bonus, 45 cent per kg. The latter was assumed when
assessing loss of income. The costs for disposal depend largely on the methods
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used to dump the milk. Different options were discussed: dumping into the
sludge well, ploughing in fields, bringing to dumping grounds, giving it to the
calves to drink. Most of these create a considerable environmental problem and
they were expected to have a very adverse response in society and the media.
Such concerns were addressed in the workshop, during which the feasibility of
this measure was rated. As a guiding figure, 2 cent per kg was assumed for the
costs.
Table VI. Consequence assessment for the countermeasures ‘no action’,
‘uncontaminated fodder’, ‘production changes’ and ‘banning’ during weeks 2-5
after the accident. Two intervention areas were investigated, viz. municipalities
where 131I concentration in milk on day 3 exceeded 500 Bq/kg and 50 Bq/kg.
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Area def. by Bq/kg of
iodine
500 50 500 50 500 50
Collective thyroid dose in
children [manSv]
6680 43.6 0.8 124 82 43.6 0.8
Thyroid cancer incidence
[No.]
53.4 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.0
Thyroid cancer fatality
[No.]
5.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Collective effective dose
[manSv]
450 2.8 0.05 14.5 11.8 2.8 0.05
Other cancer incidence
[No.]
34.3 0.2 0.0 1.3 1.0 0.2 0.0
Other cancer fatality [No.] 17.2 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.0
Costs [million euro] 0 4.8 5.8 9.1 10.9 26.1 31.5
Again, the feasibility of the countermeasures had to be assessed. Table VII
provided the background data.
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Table VII. Production data for weeks 2-5. Values were calculated for three
areas, viz. the whole computation area (about 100,000 km2) and the
municipalities where the 131I concentration in milk on day 3 exceeded 500 and
50 Bq/kg, respectively.
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Milk production [million kg] 95.88 56.50 67.88
Lactating cows [No.] 107,000 63,000 76,000
Replacement fodder needed
[million kg]
94.17 113.1
Replacement fodder needed
[No. of 500 kg bales]
188,340 226,200
Additional milk processed [million kg] 22.60 27.15
Milk to be disposed [million kg] 56.50 67.88
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""'#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In the above tables values are assessed for weeks 2 to 5, i.e. all quantities were
integrated over this time period. Basically, this was the time period during
which the iodine problem remained virulent. Thereafter caesium became focal
and the interest extended to the end of the harvesting period, i.e. weeks 6 to
12.
The countermeasure providing uncontaminated fodder could either be
prolonged or withdrawn during these weeks. Again, two intervention areas
were investigated, but this time the activity concentration of the caesium
isotopes (134Cs and 137Cs) in milk at the beginning of the period under
investigation provided the reference (Figure 5). Two intervention levels were
derived, i.e. 1000 Bq/kg from the EU’s maximum permitted levels for caesium
type isotopes, and a ten times lower level. It is worth noting that the resulting
intervention areas were considerably smaller than the former ones. The same
attributes were evaluated as before (Table VIII) and similar background
information was provided (Table IX). The integration time of the tabulated
quantities embraced weeks 6 to 12.
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Figure 5. Caesium concentration in milk 37 days after the accident.
Table VIII. Consequence assessment for the countermeasures ‘no action’ and
‘uncontaminated fodder’ during weeks 6-12 after the accident. Two intervention
areas were investigated, viz. municipalities where the caesium concentration in
milk on day 37 was expected to exceed 1000 Bq/kg and 100 Bq/kg, respectively.
	  
Collective thyroid dose in children [manSv] 122 119 39.2
Thyroid cancer incidence [No.] 1.0 1.0 0.3
Thyroid cancer fatality [No.] 0.1 0.1 0.0
Collective effective dose [manSv] 44 42.9 10.7
Other cancer incidence [No.] 4.2 4.1 1.0
Other cancer fatality [No.] 2.1 2.0 0.5
Costs [million euro] 0.0 0.01 2.5
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Table IX. Production data for weeks 6-12. Values were calculated for three
areas, viz. the whole computation area (about 100,000 km2) and the
municipalities where the caesium concentration in milk on day 37 was expected
to exceed 1000 and 100 Bq/kg, respectively.
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Milk production [million kg] 169.381 0.174 30.167
Lactating cows [No.] 107,000 200 20,000
Replacement fodder needed
[million kg]
0.290 50.278
Replacement fodder needed
[No of 500 kg bales]
580 100,556
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The investigated countermeasures for weeks 2 to 5 and those from week 6
onwards up to the end of the harvesting period can be combined in many
sensible manners. Table X shows the selection of the six strategies that were
assessed prior to the workshop. These spanned the whole period from day 7
onwards up to the end of the harvesting season.
Table X. The definition of the selected strategies.
#!%-3 ,/!
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Strategy 0 no action no action
Strategy 1 provision of uncontaminated fodder no action
Strategy 2 provision of uncontaminated fodder provision of uncontaminated fodder
Strategy 3 milk processing into butter and
milk powder
provision of uncontaminated fodder
Strategy 4 milk ban and disposal provision of uncontaminated fodder
Strategy 5 milk ban and disposal milk ban and disposal
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Table XI condensed the analysis performed so far by combined the assessments
of countermeasures during weeks 2 - 5 (Table VI) and 6 - 12 (Table VIII). It
was a major input to the workshop.
Table XI. Consequence assessment for the strategies defined in Table X.
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Collective thyroid dose in
children [manSv] 6800 128.8 40 121 40 0.8
Thyroid cancer incidence
[No.] 54.4 1.0 0.3 1.0 0.3 0.0
Thyroid cancer fatality [No.] 5.4 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Collective effective dose
[manSv] 494 44.0 11.2 22.5 11.2 0.05
Other cancer incidence
[No.] 38.6 4.2 1.1 2.1 1.1 0.0
Other cancer fatality [No] 19.3 2.1 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.0
Costs [million euro] 0 5.8 8.3 13.5 33.6 45.4
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A facilitated workshop was organised a week after the hypothetical release. A
variety of stakeholders and representatives of organisations concerned with
food-related emergency management were invited to contribute their views
and judgements. The objective was collectively to analyse the problem, to bring
together the different interests and reach agreement on the decision to be
taken. Amongst the participants were representatives from the Ministry of
Agriculture and Forestry, the National Food Administration, the Finnish Food
and Drink Industries’ Federation, the Association of Rural Advisory Centres,
Valio Ltd/Milk Pool and STUK. The workshop was a one-day event and was
facilitated by Prof. R. P. Hämäläinen. Analysts both for the decision modelling
part and for a radiological consequence assessment provided assistance
whenever necessary.
Prior to the workshop an information package was prepared and sent to the
participants. It contained a brief description of the accident and of the fallout
situation. The precautionary actions taken to protect the population were also
mentioned. An important part of it concerned the assessment of the
radiological and financial consequences of the countermeasures. This
information was provided in the form of decision tables. A list of predefined
attributes, the parties involved in decision-making and their duties were
attached. All in all, it was designed to contain all the relevant information
necessary to understand the accident situation and to be able to make an
informed decision on countermeasures.
A portable decision support system was used to support the analysis. It
consisted of seven portable notebooks, a wireless local area network, a projector
and two decision analytical software products, Web–HIPRE7 and Opinions-
Online8 (Figure 6). Web-HIPRE, a Java applet for multiple criteria decision
analysis, was used for the decision modelling and analysing the results. It
implemented the multi-attribute value theory (MAVT) and featured the
                                                     
7 http://www.hipre.hut.fi
8 http://www.opinions-online.com
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aggregation of individual models into a group model, an aspect that made it
especially suitable for the workshop. Crucial feedback was obtained by
Opinions-Online, a voting, survey and group collaboration system. Both these
tools took advantage of Web technology and supported collaborative interaction
with the decision model in the sense that they made it possible to collect and
combine the results of individual groups.
For the purpose of the exercise, a Web page containing information about the
case and the methods used was created (Figure 7). Afterwards, the results of
the workshop were also published on the Web page.
The participants formed six interest groups according to their background, i.e.
farmers, food industry, food agency, food safety authority, radiation safety
authority and citizens. Each group was equipped with a notebook that allowed
them to interact directly with Web-HIPRE and Opinions-Online. An essential
difference between this and many earlier workshops was that the participants
used the system by themselves. Approximately half of the participants had no
earlier experience in decision workshops or decision support systems, which
placed high demands on the usability of the system.
!.!
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Figure 6. The technical arrangements.
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Figure 7. Web page for the workshop
 (http://www.riihi.hut.fi/stuk/indexeng.html).
The workshop lasted for six hours, which seemed appropriate. At any rate, it
would have been difficult for the participants to allocate more time. The time
frame, however, was such that preparatory meetings were needed as in a real
situation in order to prepare the matters in advance.
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Based on the experience from the previous facilitated workshops (Hämäläinen
et al., 1998 and 2000b) and from preparatory meetings, a preliminary set of
attributes was listed and defined. It was sent in advance to the participants
annexed in the information package. At the beginning of the workshop the
attribute list was presented and put up for discussion. The participants were
urged to go through, revise, remove, add and redefine any attribute they
wished. During the whole discussion the attribute hierarchy was displayed and
suggested changes were incorporated on the fly. Eventually the group agreed
on the following set of attributes (see also Figure 8).
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The standard assumption within the radiation protection community is that
exposure to radiation increases the risk of contracting cancer, however small
the exposure. If the individual risk is very small and almost negligible,
stochastic health effects are still expected when large population groups are
exposed. The collective dose was provided as a measure for these stochastic
health effects. But it was also converted to the expected number of fatal cancer
cases because this was believed to be more expressive for persons outside the
radiation protection community. A risk factor or nominal probability coefficient
for stochastic effects (IRCP 60, 1991) of 5 x 10-2 per Sievert was used to assess
the probability for fatal cancers. A related measure was the incidence of cancer
cases. Excepting thyroid cancers, it was assumed that roughly half of the
cancer cases can be cured, i.e. there are twice as many incidents as fatal cases.
Thyroid cancer deserved special consideration because it is predominantly
children that are afflicted. In addition, thyroid cancer has a latency time of
only a few years, is rare and is easily seen in statistics. The better response to
treatment of thyroid cancer was another aspect that needed expression, i.e.
roughly 10% of thyroid cancers prove fatal whereas on average an assumed
50% of all other types of cancer cause premature death. It is above all the
consumption of radio-iodine contaminated dairy products that increase the risk
of contracting thyroid cancer. Children consume, relative to their body weight,
more milk than adults and they are also more sensitive to radiation. In
calculating the thyroid dose in children (0 - 15 years of age) account was taken
of their proportion in the population and of their different consumption rates of
milk. The risk factor used to calculate the number of fatal thyroid cancer cases
was 0.08 x 10-2 per Sievert. A breakdown into the number of thyroid cancer
cases (which appear almost solely in children) and other cancer cases was
accepted.
Also, the risk of additional traffic accidents was addressed. The group
contemplated about the potential death toll that would have to be paid if a
countermeasure that drastically increases the freight transportation volume
were to be implemented. It was concluded that the road accident risk was
small compared to the radiation related risk.
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Contamination of food is a very sensitive topic. Children in particular are
consumers of dairy products and any potential contamination of these
foodstuffs will create stress and concern. Countermeasures may also create
anxiety because it is often the case that the severity of an accident is perceived
through the protective actions taken, i.e. the more extensive these are the more
severe the accident must be and consequently the higher the health risk. But it
was also argued that countermeasures have the potential of reassuring the
population. Some of the participants liked to conceive of both of these
attributes as expressing the same thing and being in effect nothing more than
the two extremes on the same scale. Nevertheless, it was decided to include
both since in that way both viewpoints could be articulated, i.e. those who
preferred only one attribute could always ignore the other by placing zero
weight on one or other of these attributes.
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It was seen that the accident and how it is reacted to, poses a severe threat to
the whole sector of dairy production. Firstly, there would be a loss of income
due to direct restrictions in selling dairy products that exceed maximum
permitted levels. But then consumers may also react unpredictably and, for
example, reject all products that are somehow related to the affected area.
Export may suffer from a total loss of confidence in Finnish foods, a loss that is
very hard to make good. In short, it was clearly recognised that
countermeasures may have disadvantageous repercussions on the dairy
industry and this aspect needed expression. For example, turning milk into
cheese may be a sensible action in order to meet food standards (for instance,
European Commission regulated maximum permitted levels for foodstuffs and
feeding stuffs) and may also be relatively cost efficient, but the flip side of the
coin is that consumer confidence may be lost.  All this amounts to a threat that
is posed to farmers and employees in the dairy industry of the loss of their
livelihood subsequently causing social disruptions.
 )$+
The technical feasibility of countermeasures was discussed on many occasions.
In the fallout area a significant amount of milk is produced. It was mentioned
that it would be an enormous logistical problem to transport less contaminated
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replacement feedstuff into the fallout area, and if the contaminated area were
larger this action would not be feasible at all. Banning or changes to the
production routine are likely to cause considerable disposal problems. In
addition, there are no disposal plans and legal issues are not solved. The
delivery time for sorbents (ammoniumferrisyanidium) is about three months.
These objections indicate the need to identify and include in the planning
phase any constraint that may prevent or lessen the efficiency of an action.
The feasibility attribute was aimed at capturing the different applicability of
the actions in respect to logistics and/or disposal.
"!+"  
The monetary costs attribute comprised the direct costs of protective actions.
Cancer treatment costs, associated loss of GDP, and other costs that were
proportional to the number of cancer cases were excluded in order not to
double-count the cancer cases.
Figure 8. Value (or attribute) tree used in the analysis.
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Inter alia the Chernobyl accident and recently BSE disease (bovine spongiform
encephalopathy) have indicated perceived risk and related attributes (e.g.
confidence) to be major factors in the final decision-making in policy problems.
Confidence in authorities is often thought to be of crucial importance for the
risk perception in an expert organisation. Recent studies, however, have shown
only a weak relationship between confidence and risk perception. A much
stronger correlation has been found between risk perception and unknown
effects (Sjöberg, 2001). Contrary to the opinion of experts, politicians and
members of the public believe that there are many unknown effects that are
not yet understood but that still affect their risk perception and consequently
their behaviour, for instance, as consumers. These types of attributes were not
considered in the workshop. Expert organisations should, however, be aware of
the reasons why perceived risk and related attributes are added in final policy
decisions. Attributes, such as ‘confidence’ and ‘unknown effects’, which seem to
increase the safety marginal, should thus be kept in mind but not considered
on the technical level while preparing recommendations.
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Six selected intervention strategies were proposed by the preparatory team
and accepted as a working hypothesis for the decision analysis (see Table X).
For these strategies the values of the ‘hard’ attributes, i.e. costs and health
effects, were calculated in advance (Table XI). The ‘soft’ attributes, such as
social disruption and anxiety, were directly rated. In the technique used the
attribute, say anxiety, was given a value of 1 for the most preferred strategy in
respect to anxiety and zero value for the least preferred one. The other options
were rated between zero and one, according to the strength of preference for
one option over another in terms of anxiety.
Since the risk attitude of the participants was not of major concern in this case
study, the degree of preference for an option in respect to an attribute was
encoded by value functions. The values in Table XI and those given to the ‘soft’
attributes were scaled between 0 and 1, where 0 represented the worst and 1
the best value of an attribute. Linear value functions were applied throughout
the decision model to speed up this phase of the analysis. This meant, for
example, that one cancer case was effectively perceived to be as great a loss to
society independently of how many cancer cases are to be expected.
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In order to obtain the overall benefit that was achieved by each strategy, the
decision-makers assessed the weights of the attributes. These weights
represented their judgements as to the relative importance of the levels of the
attributes. Each of the six interest groups assessed the weights with the Web-
HIPRE software but only one weight per attribute, as the group members
agreed on a single value.
The Swing method (von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986) was used to elicit the
preference weights of the attributes. In this method all attributes were initially
at their lowest preference levels and the participants were asked, if just one of
the attributes could be moved to its best level, which one they would chose.
After this change had been made, they were asked which attribute they would
next choose to move to its best level, and so on until all the attributes had been
ranked. The first ranking attribute was given a weight of 100 and the weights
of all the other attributes were assessed by comparing the importance of their
respective swings from the lowest to the highest level with the swing in the
first ranking attribute.
The overall ranking of the strategies was derived from the weighted average of
the scores for each attribute. Each group aggregated the values, and in possible
problem situations experts familiar with the software provided assistance.
Each interest group eventually had a ranking of the strategies that
incorporated their value judgements. The individual models were stored in the
server and the results could be displayed on the projection screen. The
individual models were eventually aggregated into a group model, which
showed the overall ranking by all the groups together. In the group model
(Figure 9), each element on the criteria level described the corresponding
group. The scores for these elements were the group’s individual scores for
each strategy. The aggregation was done by averaging the overall score that
each strategy achieved within each group, and each group element was equally
weighted.
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Figure 9.  The group model.
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Initially, each interest group independently evaluated the strategies. Figures
10a - 10c show the evaluation of the strategies for groups one to three. These
figures not only show the overall ranking but also what factors are important
and which are decisive in the ranking. For example, it can be seen that costs
were decisive for group 1, whereas groups 2 and 3 emphasised the health
effects. Most groups put a lot of weight on health effects and therefore doing
nothing (strategy 0) was not a viable option for them, since it meant several
dozen cancer cases.
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Kuva 10a. Evaluation of the strategies by  interest group 1.
Kuva 10b. Evaluation of the strategies by interest group 2.
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Kuva 10c. Evaluation of the strategies by interest group 3.
Although each interest group made an independent value judgement, the
rankings that resulted had some aspects in common. Strategy 0, i.e. doing
nothing, scored low within all groups and this was mainly due to the fact that
adverse health effects were so disproportionate. Any other strategy
investigated resulted in considerable dose savings and hence rather moderate
health implications. Consequently, monetary costs, social disruption and
psychosocial factors turned out to be more important.
Strategy 2, i.e. provision of uncontaminated fodder throughout both periods,
was ranked best by all but one group. This strategy scored evenly on all
attributes, i.e. costs were moderate and the health threat was kept within
reasonable bounds. The strategy also achieved a certain degree of reassurance
without undue disturbance of business and life. Finally, it was not considered
to pose a considerable threat to the economy and it had a good chance of being
implemented.
As mentioned earlier, all models were aggregated into a group model (Figure
11). This model also reflects the predominate preference for strategy 2. As
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expected, a change in the weight with which each interest group contributed to
the aggregated model did not have much influence on this.
In the questionnaire, the participants were asked which strategies would be
generally acceptable to them (Table XIIc). Strategies 2 and 3 were approved by
13 participants. It was pointed out during the workshop that dairies have the
potential to make changes to the production routine in order to ensure the
safety of their products. This is reflected in the answer, since strategy 3 was
the only one that required changes to production.
Figure 11.  Aggregated groups priorities of the strategies.
Still further insight was gained by analysing the sensitivity of the outcome for
changes in the weight given to certain attributes. Figure 12 shows, for
example, the implications of group 1’s decision when stressing the cost factor.
When it had a weight of 0.42 strategy 2 scored best, but as soon as the costs
weighed more than 0.52 strategy 1 started to be favourable. A sensitivity
analysis of the other groups’ outcomes showed that the rankings were rather
sensitive to change in the weight that was given to the cost attribute. The
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sensitivity in respect to costs was mainly due to the fact that the strategies
were almost equally successful in avoiding radiation-induced cancers, so that
the other factors, including costs, became decisive.
Figure 12. Sensitivity analysis of the cost attribute (group 1).
;/ ># 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At the end of the workshop the participants were asked to fill in a
questionnaire by means of Opinion-Online. The feedback is summarised in
Tables XII and XIII. All the participants considered that the workshop was
useful, and most of them also thought that a similar approach could be
valuable for training and exercises. The attitude towards an application in the
case of an emergency was slightly more hesitant, but in general still positive.
Generally, it was seen that the ranking that emerged from the decision
analysis corresponded to intuitive expectations.
Uncertainty issues played a minor role during the workshop, although it was
recognised that both the assessments of the attributes and the weights the
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attributes received were only reliable to varying degrees. In the questionnaire
these uncertainties were believed to be typically about 20 percent9. There was
greater hesitation as regards the assessment of costs.
Table XII.  Evaluation of the Opinion-Online questionnaire (13 answers).
a) Suitability of the approach
?? ? , ,,
@
 +
A workshop is suitable for providing a
comprehensive picture of the situation in
training and exercises.
0 10 1 1 1
A workshop is suitable for providing a
comprehensive picture in the case of
emergency.
0 7 3 2 1
A workshop is suitable for finding a strategy
during training and exercises. 3 8 2 0 0
A workshop is suitable for finding a strategy
in case of emergency. 1 7 4 0 1
The ranking achieved with Web-HIPRE
corresponds to my intuitive expectations. 0 12 0 0 1
It was difficult to grasp and follow the
method used to elicit the trade-offs between
attributes.
0 1 10 1 1
The case study was useful in general. 1 12 0 0 0
                                                     
9 It seems that it was overlooked that the scenario description mentioned dose assessments as
being accurate only within a factor of 2 to 3.
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b) Reliability of assessments
A/B ±/B ±0
B
±0
B
±/0
B
8/0
B
@
 +
How accurate do you judge the
assessment of
– health effects
– social effects
– costs
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
1
2
6
5
2
1
2
4
0
3
4
1
2
1
How accurate was the weighing
of the attributes? 0 0 3 8 1 0 0
c) Strategies that were approved by the participants
""' -! 
Strategy 0, no action - no action 0
Strategy 1, clean fodder - no action 3
Strategy 2, clean fodder- clean fodder 13
Strategy 3, milk processing- clean fodder 13
Strategy 4, ban on milk - clean fodder 11
Strategy 5, ban on milk - ban on milk 3
As mentioned earlier, the participants were provided with an information
package in advance. It contained in somewhat condensed form the information
given in Chapters 2 and 3. Further, it contained a list of possible attributes
and a brief description of the parties involved in the decision-making. The
main points in this information package were repeated during the briefing at
the outset of the facilitated workshop. While most of the participants found the
amount of information suitable (Table XIII), two thought that there was too
much and another two missed some information that they desired, for example,
thematic maps of the deposition and activity concentration in butter and
cheese. All the thematic maps provided were appreciated, though.
With a few exceptions, the participants judged both the strategies and the
attributes to be relevant. The attributes were mostly accepted, but some
participants found it hard to express some aspects of their value judgement, or
they were disturbed by some redundancy in the attributes. Others expressed
the opinion that some attributes were difficult to apply and assess. Concerning
the strategies, it was remarked that they were not sufficiently deliberated
upon and not realistic enough. There were also too few strategies that have
been assessed in advance. It was remarked, for example, that dairies could
change the production processes in ways that were not considered in the
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information package (assorting milk was given as an example). Some
participants found it difficult to grasp the definition of the strategies.
More general comments were that it was a valuable experience and worth of
being repeated or built upon. One participant was slightly annoyed by the
jargon used occasionally.
Table XIII.  Evaluation of the information package (11 answers).
+ " @ +
Was the amount of information suitable? 7 4 -
Were the thematic maps useful? 11 - -
Were the proposed strategies relevant? 8 3 -
Were the proposed attributes relevant? 9 1 1
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It was observed here as well as in earlier facilitated workshops that decision
analytical tools and group techniques are useful. Most of the participants
considered the format of a facilitated workshop and the use of an interactive
decision support system applicable in exercises and many of them also in real-
life situations. The workshop revealed many issues that could be utilised in
nuclear emergency preparedness and management.
A lesson learnt from our previous workshops was that it could be very time-
consuming to start from scratch, to define the attributes and assure that all
participants understand their meaning. Therefore, we drafted a set of
attributes that was presented at the outset of the workshop. The facilitator
stressed the preliminary character of the attributes and urged the participants
to revise them whenever necessary. Eventually the group settled on the
attributes described in Section 4.2. The questionnaire revealed that the
participants were rather confident about the assessments of the attributes.
Although we did not undertake a systematic analysis to derive optimal
intervention levels for the accident scenario, the analysis nevertheless suggests
that countermeasures at concentration levels well below established
intervention levels can be justified in certain accident scenarios. In this study,
intervention levels a decade below internationally recommended ones were
justified. To ease the calculation of the health consequences, neither regional
extent of a countermeasure nor the timing was a parameter that could have
been varied freely in order to find an optimum level. We used intervention
levels to define the regional extent of a countermeasure and only two choices
were assessed beforehand. We also fixed the application times of the
countermeasures (the first set of measures was applied during weeks 2 to 5
and another set during weeks 6 to 12). Only one measure could be in place at
any one time and different countermeasures could only be implemented in
succession.
The decision analysis reveals the intervention strategy that ranks best and is
justified and optimised. The benefits of this strategy are greater than the
associated detriments and the net benefit is maximal within the selected set of
strategies. In the justification and optimisation process the decision-makers
STUK-A186
49
have to trade-off the levels of all relevant attributes and not only monetary
costs and avertable dose as in a simple cost-benefit analysis. In this process
decision-makers have to make the most of the resources available to society. It
is sensible to assume that they put at least as much effort into avoiding
radiation induced health risks than they do into avoiding similar non-radiation
related health risks. A measure used in cost-benefit analysis to express this
effort is the α-value. It expresses the amount of money that is assigned to
avoiding a unit collective dose. For strategies 2 and 3, which scored best, the α-
values were 9,000 euro and 15,000 euro, respectively. These values are well
within the range of internationally recommended α-values, which vary from
3,300 to 110,000 euro per manSv (ICRP Publication 63).
The ranking of the strategies proved to be rather sensitive to changes in the
weight of the cost attribute. This finding suggests that, above all, the economic
implications of countermeasures need further research. In this study only a
simplified picture of economic realities was given.
It was seen that the imposition of activity limits (for instance, the European
Commission’s maximum permitted levels for foodstuffs) might remain an
academic exercise since consumers may reject any suspicious products and are
free to choose whatever product they like. The need for a certification system
was addressed in this context as a means to assure consumer confidence.
The feasibility of countermeasures was addressed during the preparatory
meetings, but there were many more discussions throughout the workshop. It
was not always easy to judge the feasibility of a countermeasure because
expertise was not available in all relevant fields. The general observation was
that some indicators are needed that allow the experts to assess the feasibility
aspect. Ideally these indicators are expressed in units that the experts are
accustomed to. For example, to judge the logistical feasibility of provision of
uncontaminated replacement fodder, the number of trucks needed to supply
daily needs was more expressive than the number of bales, which in turn was
more expressive than the tons of replacement hay needed. However, it would
be certainly worthwhile to investigate this question further.
The hypothetical fallout area was a major milk production area of Finland. If
feeding on pasture grass were to be replaced with uncontaminated fodder, over
three million kilograms of replacement fodder would be needed each day. To
transport these amounts several hundred trucks are needed. Most of the
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participants thought that this could be arranged. The banning and disposal of
milk, on the other hand, would create an enormous disposal problem. Almost
two million litres of milk is produced every day and such amounts cannot be
fed to the calves. Both dumping into the sludge well and ploughing into fields
were considered to be doubtful methods. In addition, the legal aspects of such a
measure are unclear and no emergency plans exist for the dumping of large
amounts of contaminated substances such as milk or milk powder, processing
water or grass. For these reasons, and because milk is produced every day and
hardly storable and consequently any alarming contamination of milk calls for
an almost immediate decision, it was suspected that the disposal of milk was
not a feasible option at all. It was mentioned that hormonal treatment of the
lactating cows might provide a transitional solution, though not an immediate
one, to reduce the milk production. In the long run, i.e. if the milk remains
unusable for a considerable time, slaughtering the animals was thought to be a
better solution. It was not possible, however, to resolve these issues during the
workshop.
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It is important that all relevant parties come together to deliberate on
countermeasures in nuclear emergency situations. The experience gained in
the workshop strongly supports the format of a facilitated workshop to tackle a
decision problem that concerns different stakeholders. The realistic nature and
the disciplined process of a facilitated workshop yielded valuable information
for emergency planning. The workshop exemplified that the chosen setting can
be fruitfully applied during exercises, especially during those of the later phase
of emergency management. The feedback from the workshop was very positive
and encourages the view that it could be a valuable instrument when revising
emergency plans or in order to identify issues that need to be resolved.
Multi-attribute decision analysis provided a suitable framework to deal with
the complexity of the decision problem. It helped to clarify the objectives (‘avoid
radiation-induced cancer cases’) and to identify the attributes (‘radiation dose’
or ‘number of cancer cases’) that can be used to measure the success of a
strategy in achieving the objective. It provided a reasoning framework that
intertwined beliefs, preferences and value judgments of the stakeholders and
achieved a transparent ranking of the different strategies available.
Information technology played an important role in the workshop. It was a new
quality of the workshop that the participants could directly interact and
experiment with their own decision models, and they encountered no
noteworthy problems in doing so. Since both Web-HIPRE and Opinion-Online
are Web-based applications and can be accessed by the ubiquity of Web
browsers, they provided an easy-to-use user interface and required very little
introduction. With this software support, instant aggregation of group
decisions and of a consensus model were easily obtained. A special Web page
was created for the workshop and provided all relevant information on the case
study; it also made updated results of the decision analysis available.
The technical equipment used during the workshop is easily installable at
different locations. This facilitates the use of the system, for example, in
situations where decision-makers’ mobility is restricted. This was
demonstrated by the ease that the equipment was transported to and installed
at the meeting location. Since the software is Internet-based, it enables remote
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participation and the use of external information, such as video material from
the accident location. The equipment and state-of-the-art software support
greatly eased the conduction of the workshop. It allowed the participants to
concentrate on the issues at hand and not too much time went into mastering
unfamiliar technology.
The study revealed the need to further develop methods to assess the
radiological and cost implications of food countermeasures. The food industry is
dynamic and complex in nature. In order to provide consequence assessments
it is necessary to take process, economic, demographic and geographical
information into account. Also the feasibility and constraints of protective
actions need further investigation.
At this point it may be worthwhile to look back to the initial objectives and see
how they were met. We first wished to shed light on countermeasures that aim
to avoid or at least reduce the dose received from the consumption of
contaminated dairy products. We analysed a handful of strategies in a
hypothetical accident scenario and managed to assess the collective dose, the
expected number of additional cancer cases and the costs. Also, some
additional information could be provided that allowed us to judge the
feasibility of a strategy.
Another goal was to introduce the values, beliefs and preferences that were
held by the different interest groups. We believe that the decision analytical
approach provided a suitable framework to account for all this. It proved
worthwhile because it helped the participants to go through all the phases of
the decision-making process in a logical and efficient manner. For example,
when constructing the attribute (or objective) hierarchy, they were encouraged
to think about all the factors that are important to them in this context. An
important achievement of the induced discussion was that some definitions
were clarified and others revised. But probably more important was that it
created a common understanding of the decision problem. At a later stage the
participants were asked to consider explicitly the necessary trade-offs between
the attributes, and the given preference statements revealed the perceived
importance of each attribute in relation to all the others. Thus, the analysis did
not merely yield a ranking of the strategies investigated; it also revealed the
reasoning behind. In addition, it stimulated a degree of commitment that is
needed from all interest groups to carry out effectively any intervention agreed
upon.
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Finally, we wished to promote the computer-supported facilitated workshop
approach. The workshop provided the participants with a forum that allowed
them to communicate efficiently and share their views of the decision problem.
This helped to create a common understanding of the problem domain and
opened minds for the wider implications of milk countermeasures. The
participants learned about the views of other groups that have an interest (and
a say) in the matter. The benefit of the decision analysis approach in the
facilitated workshop was that it gave the participants a means to structure the
whole problem. It urged them to clearly set and define the objectives,
deliberate on alternative actions, i.e. how objectives are achieved, and equally
importantly, to think what are the consequences of the actions taken. The
process focused on the essential information needed in decision-making and
provided for outsiders.
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